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A recent trend in decentralization in several large and 
diverse countries is the creation of local jurisdictions 
below the regional level—municipalities, towns, 
and villages—whose spending is almost exclusively 
financed by grants from both regional and national 
governments. This paper argues that such grants-financed 
decentralization enables politicians to target benefits to 
pivotal voters and organized interest groups in exchange 
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for political support. Decentralization, in this model, 
is subject to political capture, facilitating vote-buying, 
patronage, or pork-barrel projects, at the expense of 
effective provision of broad public goods. There is 
anecdotal evidence on local politics in several large 
countries that is consistent with this theory. The paper 
explores its implications for international development 
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1. Introduction 
Decentralization in the developing world has involved the political selection of 
the design of local jurisdictions by central and regional governments. In many countries, 
especially in the African and South Asian regions, and in poor provinces in Latin 
America, the governments’ choice of decentralization instruments results in the creation 
of very local village-level governments, with low capacity, almost no access to own tax 
bases, and spending and decision-making powers restricted to the administering of 
higher-tier grants for local infrastructure and beneficiary selection of welfare schemes. In 
contrast, decentralization to municipalities or cities with revenue-raising potential has 
been stalled, with revenue powers being retained by central or regional governments.
1 
Also, in the case of local public services such as village schools, even as some 
institutions for community participation are created, teacher management powers remain 
with central or regional governments. Devarajan et al (2009) have characterized such 
decentralization as “partial”, and have examined its implications for local service 
delivery. 
This paper addresses the question of why countries choose to decentralize 
partially.
 In one view, even grants-based decentralization to rural local governments is a 
significant institutional reform to address political agency problems in developing 
countries, particularly of government responsiveness to poor citizens (World Bank, 
various; Bardhan, 2002).
2 This paper examines grants-financed decentralization from an 
alternate perspective, as a strategic political choice which enables the targeting of 
benefits to select constituents, at the expense of broad public goods. In this model, 
decentralization is subject to political capture, with local spending targeted to vote-
buying, patronage, or pork barrel projects. The tension in the model is between clientelist 
politics (targeted transfers to buy votes) versus the broad public interest—clientelist 
                                                 
1 In India, for example, decentralization has largely taken the form of charging locally elected village 
governments, the Gram Panchayats, with beneficiary selection of poverty alleviation schemes; while 
municipal governments with access to tax bases and user charges are denied the power to set these, and 
local revenue-raising power is retained by state governments (Mohanty et al, 2007; Sahsranaman, 2009). 
2 Governments in developing countries pursuing decentralization reforms also describe these as designed to 
promote greater participation of poor citizens in public decision-making, and to strengthen citizen ability to 
exact accountability from their public agents. For example, these views were provided in publicly available 
conference papers by the initiator of Bolivia’s Ley de Participacion Popular (Sanchez de Lozada, 2000), 
and the implementer of India’s Panchayati Raj Act (Aiyer, 2009).   3
transfers may indeed be targeted to the poor, but only to some of them or only in small 
amounts, at the expense of broad public goods for larger numbers.
3  
The paper therefore explores a political economy explanation for cases where 
decentralization remains partial long since the initiation of reforms. It argues that partial 
decentralization is selected and maintained by politicians in the face of increasing 
participation by swing voters, because it enables them to win elections by dividing the 
strength of swing voters, and continue to provide targeted benefits to core supporters. 
Decentralization in this theory helps prolong clientelistic political competition at the 
expense of broad public goods platforms, even when elections become more broad-based 
and contested.  
This risk of “political capture” of decentralization is to be distinguished from that 
of elite capture analyzed by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 2005, 2006a). Under 
political capture, even when local spending is better targeted to poor citizens than 
centrally or provincially allocated spending, such local targeting enables central or 
regional political parties to buy votes and win elections even as they reduce general 
government allocations to broad public goods. Much of the evaluation of impact of 
moving from centralized to decentralized resource allocation has focused on whether the 
benefit incidence of decentralized spending is more likely to be on poorer households 
(Araujo et al, 2008; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; 
Mansuri and Rao, 2004). This paper does not compare allocations by central and local 
agents, instead examining the political choice to decentralize and its implications for 
consolidated government tax and spending decisions.  
The theoretical framework is derived from the literature on political determinants 
of fiscal policy, where political parties consist of organized interest groups that derive 
benefits from holding office and from club goods targeted to their group (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Persson et al, 2007). Within this political 
economy framework, it is difficult to find technical (non-political) conditions under 
which any governing party would choose to decentralize, even when a benevolent 
                                                 
3 Indeed, theoretical and empirical studies of “vote-buying” have concluded that such transfers are targeted 
to the poor (Harding, 2008; Stokes, 2005; Brusco et al, 2004).   4
planner would for reasons of heterogeneity of preferences across local settlements. This 
is because any governing party would have to give up revenue-raising authority to 
jurisdictions where rival parties could come to power and thereby exercise control over 
the allocation of those revenues.  
Again, within this political economy framework, even if a benevolent planner 
manages to gain leadership and initiate decentralization reforms, the implementation of 
those reforms would be subsequently subject to political capture. Political incentives for 
decentralization can be created in this framework under assumptions of political 
advantages from mobilization of votes through local elections. Political selection of 
decentralization, or political capture of benevolent decentralization in this model would 
be characterized primarily by overwhelming or exclusive dependence on grants for local 
government spending and little or no devolution of revenue raising authority. Local 
government spending decisions would be characterized by welfare transfers to poor 
swing voters in exchange for their vote. Inter-jurisdiction grants distribution would be 
influenced by political affiliations of local incumbents.  
Changes in political participation in elections would have implications for the size 
and distribution of local government grants. When higher tier political incumbents face 
more demanding “swing” voters, decentralized delivery of welfare programs may be used 
for more effective targeting of the “cheapest” swing votes, at lower levels of  progressive 
taxes and public goods than in the absence of decentralized vote-buying. That is, this 
framework can create another type of “swing voter’s curse”, in which greater demands by 
them for public goods are thwarted through greater decentralized vote buying. 
Decentralization policies are therefore determined in this model by politicians to facilitate 
vote mobilization for their political party to win office, akin to gerrymandering districts 
in electoral politics. 
The fiscal characteristics of decentralization implied by this political economy 
framework are in fact increasingly common in many developing countries. Large 
amounts of public resources for anti-poverty programs are being provided as grants to 
rural local governments who have the authority to select beneficiaries of local projects 
(Ravallion, 1999; Alderman, 2002; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee,   5
2005, 2006b). In several decentralized countries in Africa, South and East Asia, more 
than 90 percent of local government expenditures are financed by grants from higher tiers 
(Choudhuri, 2006; World Bank, various).
4 Additionally, studies in a range of countries as 
diverse as Albania, Brazil, India, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Sweden, and the United 
States, find evidence that higher tiers of governments strategically distribute grants across 
local jurisdictions to favor their political supporters (reviews in Boex and Martinez-
Vazquez, 2005; and Khemani, 2006).  
There is some available evidence, mostly anecdotal, from a range of countries, 
including Brazil, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the Philippines, on the salience of vote-
buying, patronage, and violence in local elections (Bardhan et al, 2008; Cheema and 
Mohmand, 2008). In the political capture model presented here, and in this anecdotal 
evidence, the capture of public resources for private benefits need not be restricted to the 
elite; even poor and traditionally disadvantaged voters may demand private goods from 
local politicians (such as jobs, subsidies, cash and in-kind transfers) instead of broad 
public goods (such as quality health and education).  
Indeed, the critical assumption required to derive the result of political capture of 
decentralization for greater clientelism at the expense of broad public goods, is that the 
pivotal swing voters in local jurisdictions provide strictly greater vote returns when 
allocated private transfers instead of broad public goods. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) use 
completely opposite assumptions, of the increasing value of the public good to pivotal 
voters, to explain the extension of suffrage by English elites in the mid-late 1800s. They 
argue and provide some evidence that in England, the increase in the value of urban 
public goods following the industrial revolution (public health infrastructure such as 
sewerage, waterworks and paved roads), led to a majority of the franchised elite pushing 
for reforms to extend the suffrage so that political parties would have stronger incentives 
to deliver these public goods. They show that following suffrage reforms, spending by 
municipal corporations on public health infrastructure increased substantially, while 
spending on welfare transfers to the poor was reduced. That is, a diametrically different 
                                                 
4 Even this number, 90 percent, masks the true extent of grants dependence of rural local governments 
which is closer to 99 percent when some cities that do raise significant resources from own revenues are 
excluded from the calculation.   6
conclusion than that provided here of local spending on targeted transfers. It has 
implications for innovation in current institutional interventions to improve 
accountability for public goods in developing countries by influencing the demands of 
pivotal voters. 
In modeling decentralization as an endogenous political decision, this paper 
differs from traditional theories of the benefits of decentralization predicated upon the 
natural existence of local jurisdictions with intra-community common preferences and 
inter-community heterogeneity (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972). However, there are 
surprisingly few formal models of the political choice to decentralize powers and 
resources to lower level jurisdictions. Available models of endogenous decentralization, 
to the best of the authors’ knowledge, are all consistent with the original insight of Oates 
(1972) that decentralization arises from regional heterogeneity of preferences. 
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2002) model state legislative decision-making for 
decentralization to districts within a state, and obtain as an equilibrium greater likelihood 
of decentralization in those states where there is greater heterogeneity of preferences 
across districts (on the policy issue being considered for decentralization, in this case 
liquor licensing in the USA). Cremer and Palfrey (1996), Lockwood (2004), and 
Redoano and Scharf (2004) examine the role of decision-making rules, national referenda 
versus legislative voting, majority and unanimity rules, in the selection of the degree of 
centralization, with preferences for decentralization distributed regionally. 
There is other work exploring decentralization to local governments as a political 
strategy, focusing on incentives of national politicians to bypass regional governments 
that pose a political threat. Dickovick (2007) analyzes decentralization to municipalities 
in Peru, Brazil and South Africa as a strategy adopted by national politicians to weaken 
intermediate levels of government. O’Neill (2003) argues that political parties devolve 
greater resources when support for them is more secure in local than in national elections, 
citing evidence from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. However, these 
works do not draw specific implications for the characteristics of decentralization and 
ensuing local politics as derived here. Finally, there are several descriptions in the 
literature of decentralization as a political tool to accommodate ethnic or regional conflict 
within countries, but most of these relate to the creation of larger province-type   7
jurisdictions, with significant local autonomy, and not to the creation of fiscal authority at 
the level of villages or towns, the tier for which implications are drawn in this paper 
(Panizza, 1999).  
The theory offered in this paper of the political selection of jurisdiction 
boundaries has policy implications for international development assistance. Technical 
assistance and lending programs typically focus on addressing vertical and horizontal 
fiscal “imbalances”, spring-boarding from the observation that new local governments 
are not devolved “sufficient” grants to fulfill the expenditure responsibilities assigned to 
them. This paper suggests that when jurisdiction boundaries are deliberately chosen to 
keep them grants-dependent for political targeting, focusing policy largely on increasing 
grants to existing jurisdictions for greater local spending can exacerbate patronage 
politics. It can fuel people’s evaluation of local governments on the basis of funding and 
projects that can be garnered from above, at the expense of inter and intra-jurisdiction 
competition on the basis of competency to deliver broad public goods with scarce 
resources. Instead, the political analysis suggests strengthening other strategies that focus 
on identifying institutional and governance interventions to undercut patronage incentives 
and enable voters to mobilize to demand broad public services.  
The next section provides a new theoretical framework for the choice of 
decentralization of public spending to local jurisdictions, financed by grants, to serve 
electoral objectives. Section 3 discusses some evidence on decentralization experiences 
in select countries and regions that are consistent with the theory. Section 4 discusses the 
implications of the theory for international development assistance and explores the 
potential of local governance interventions to overcome local patronage politics. Section 
5 concludes. 
2. The theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework here to analyze political selection of decentralization is 
drawn from a large literature on the political economy of fiscal policy choices (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Persson et al, 2007). A basic premise in 
these models is that voters organize themselves into interest groups, represented by 
political parties, to influence public policy for their group’s benefit. Khemani and Wane   8
(2009) introduced into these models another type of voter, the poor and unorganized 
voter, who only receives benefits from public spending programs (not from a party 
representing their interests being in power). The paper first adapts Khemani and Wane’s 
(2009) centralized political decision-making model to the problem of choice between 
targeted transfers to buy votes versus allocating to the broad public good, and then 
examines its implications for the decision to decentralize. 
Consider a population with 3 groups indexed by j. The welfare of group j’s 
member is given by: 
) ( ) , ( g H c g c W
j j                                                  
W( ) is an increasing and concave function, 
j c  is private consumption, and  g  is a 
general public good such as village-wide infrastructure provision. Two of these groups 
are economic elites, controlling different economic resources, paying taxes, and 
organized into political interest groups (political parties) to gain private rents from office 
and public spending. The third group is poor, with income normalized to zero (and hence 
does not pay taxes), is not organized into a political group and therefore votes solely on 
the basis of individual benefits received from government spending. Let the 2 elite groups 
organized into political parties be designated  1 P , and  2 P , and the third group of 
unorganized voters be designated as the swing voters S .
 5 The size of each group is 
denoted by 
j  ,  for  S P P j , , 2 1  .  
For S j  , 
j j j r y c     . That is, the consumption of members of political 
parties consists of their disposable income, the difference between initial income 
j y  and 
the income tax  , plus a private rent 
j r  targeted towards group members from public 
resources. For S j  ,  0 
S y , and  ) (g H f W
s s   . That is, members of the 
                                                 
5 The characterization of this group as swing voters is consistent with several different characterizations in 
the literature of what it means to be “swing”. First, swing voters in this model are indifferent between 
voting for or against an incumbent government, based upon comparing the benefits of economic policy 
against a reservation utility (as in Persson et al; 2006). Second, swing voters in this model are not 
ideologically attached to political parties, and vote only the basis of evaluating general public policies of 
incumbent governments (as in Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1995, 1996; and much of 
the political science literature). Third, some models define swing voters as those whose ballot ultimately 
determine the outcome of elections (as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996), which also happens in the 
equilibrium in this model.    9
unorganized swing group do not have any income, cannot be taxed, and receive welfare 
only from government spending on public goods and any welfare transfers 
s f  targeted to 
their group.
  
Raising taxes is costly for the government. It may need to allocate resources for 
enforcing the payment of taxes and prevent tax evasion for instance. We assume that 
when the government imposes an amount τ in taxes it only collects θ(τ)*τ i.e. the cost 
associated with this level of taxation is (1-θ(τ))*τ. The inefficiency of the tax system is 
captured by  ) (   which has the following usual properties for an inverted-U Laffer curve 
for tax revenues:  1 ) ( 0     ,  0 ) (     , and  0 ) (       for  j y
j    , 0  . The tax rate 
at which revenues are maximized is given by 
max    . Correspondingly, the maximum 
amount of public good that can be provided in this economy is given by 
max max   g . 
The general public good  g , the rents to political party members, 
j r , and the 
private transfers to swing voters,
s f , are financed one-to-one with tax revenues, and 
satisfy non-negativity constraints j f g
j       0    and     0    . The government budget 
constraint is therefore given by: 
) (   R g f r
s s
S j
j j      






j R      ) ( ) (  is the government’s tax revenue when the tax rate is  .   
The politics. The two political parties 1 P , and  2 P  compete during elections to win 
a majority of votes, and choose the policy vector ] , , [
j f g p   . Any member of the 
political parties, 
j   for  2 1,P P j   can be a candidate. The political party that wins office 
chooses policies to maximize the welfare of its members (core constituents) subject to a 
re-election constraint (to be derived below), in addition to the budget constraint specified 
in equation (2) above. The objective function of party j in government is given by: 




    )] ( [   
j
} , , { max  

    
B represents the rents or benefits (outside of fiscal policy) from holding office, 
which are shared equally among all members of the party. Note that swing voters and 
opposition party supporters do not enter the government’s objective function. Any   10
transfers to them would be determined by their role in the re-election constraint to be 
derived below. Political parties in this model are therefore both partisan and 
opportunistic. They cater to the interests of their core constituents once in office, but also 
choose policies to try to win elections and gain office. The core-supporters
j   of political 
party j, always vote for the party to which they are attached, consistent with the party’s 
objective of maximizing the welfare of its supporters subject to re-election and budget 
constraints.
  
The unorganized or swing voters cast their ballot for the incumbent government if 
their welfare under government policy,
s f g H  ) ( is higher than or equal to a reservation 
utility parameter ω; otherwise they vote for the opposition.
 The swing voters’ reservation 
utility parameter ω is distributed on the support  ] , [   , with density f and cumulative F 
which are common knowledge.
6  
When the incumbent implements the policy ] , , [
j f g p    it can expect to receive 
) ) ( (
s S f g H F    of swing voters’ ballots. The remaining swing voters 
)) ) ( ( 1 (
s S f g H F     will punish the incumbent and vote for the opposition. The 
incumbent government party  G j  therefore receives  ) ) ( (
s S G f g H F      of the 









s f g H F
2
) ) ( (  or  ) ( ) (
1 
   F f g H
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Where ) (
G G G        is the difference in size of the core constituents of the 
two political parties.   is the minimum swing votes the incumbent government needs to 
win re-election. 
The political distortion. In the absence of political considerations, a utilitarian 
social planner would solve only the public goods and taxation problem, setting all 
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6 We assume that  0    i.e. the swing voters expect to be at least as well off as under laissez-faire with no 
taxation and no public goods or spending targeted to them.   11
subject to  


   
S j
j R g      ) ( ) ( ,  0  g , and  y   0 . 
The solution is familiar, given by:    1 ] ) ( [ ) (
1 *      
     g H , 
* *) ( g R   The 
level of public goods supplied in the utilitarian optimum equates marginal social benefit 
of the public good to its marginal social cost of production. The utilitarian government 
raises just enough taxes to finance the production of the public good, spending nothing on 
targeted transfers to organized interest groups or individual swing voters.
7 
When political considerations are taken into account, the incumbent political 
party will deviate from this optimum and aim to provide targeted transfers to its core 
constituents, and perhaps also to some swing voters to win elections. The extent to which 
it is able to capture public benefits for its core supporters depends upon its prospects for 
gaining public office which in turn depends upon how demanding swing voters are, or the 
function F(ω) chosen by nature.
8 
We now derive the preferred levels of the tax, the public good, and targeted rents 
of an incumbent political party, denoted by




* respectively, or the policy 
package incumbents would implement if their re-election constraint were ignored or not 
binding. A government’s optimization of the welfare of its core constituents consists of a 
two-step procedure. First, it chooses the tax rate that maximizes the disposable income of 
its constituents to whom all tax proceeds are redistributed:
9 
    
 ) ( max







j G    

 . 
                                                 
7 If the objective of the social planner is redistribution, to equalize welfare or to guarantee a minimum level 
of welfare for the poorest group, then private transfers to the poorest may emerge in equilibrium depending 
on the gains to welfare from public goods versus private transfers. 
8 In our model, if voters could cooperate and choose the distribution of reservation utilities (as in Persson et 
al. , 2000) they will set it in a way to extract the maximum amount of public good from whatever 
government is in place. This assumption is, however, unrealistic since it requires a high level of 
information. It is also inconsistent with our modeling of swing voters as unorganized, and therefore unable 
to coordinate. We instead consider atomistic voters who cannot communicate or cooperate. Each swing 
voter will then independently set her reservation utility or will be assigned one by nature. 
9 The simultaneous use of inefficient transfers to and taxes on the same group was a puzzling feature of 
African fiscal policies highlighted in Bates’ (1981) classic study of political economy. In our model, 
transfers are redistributive, to lower the net tax burden on the incumbent political group. Taxes across 
groups are uniform, the underlying rationale being to avoid additional distortions to revenue generation 
from economic decision-making by the rival groups.    12
The first order condition for the above maximization, where 
G *   denotes the 
preferred tax rate, satisfies  1 )] ( ) ( [
* * *     
G G G G        or 
G G R     ) (
* .  
Second, the government chooses that optimal level of the public good that would 
be financed by its constituents alone, equating the marginal benefit and costs of the 
public good accruing only to its constituents, or 
G G g H  1 ) (
*   . Note that this level of 
public good is lower than the utilitarian social planner’s optimum. 
Finally, it redistributes the total tax revenue, net of public good spending, 
amongst its constituents, giving no specific transfers to the members of the opposition 
party or to swing voters. The government’s constituents thus receive 
G G G G G j g R r r   ] ) ( [
* * * *
    as specific transfer, which gives them a consumption 
level of 
G G G j r y c
* * *
    ,  G j . The other groups not represented in the government 
do not receive any rents i.e.  0
* 
G j








The incumbent government can choose its preferred policy package when its 
preferred level of public good is sufficient to win the minimum swing votes needed for 
electoral victory, or    )) ( (
*G g H F . It would also choose this when re-election is entirely 
out of reach, which happens when swing voters are too demanding and the minimum 
swing votes required for victory cannot be obtained even by spending all revenues on 
them at the maximum tax rate 
max  That is, governments anticipate defeat in an upcoming 
election, and implement predatory policy (their most preferred policy). 
Incumbent government’s constrained choice under re-election. Suppose that 
the distribution of reservation utilities is such that  )) ( ( )) ( (
max * g H F g H F
G    . The 
government can then either increase the level of the public good or provide targeted 
transfers to swing voters until it receives the minimum swing votes  . The decision to re-
allocate resources away from the preferred allocation, in which the core constituents of 
                                                 
10 We assume throughout the paper that
G G g R
* * ) (   j  . This assumption means that the preferred tax 
rate of the government generates at least enough revenue to pay for its preferred level of public good. This 
assumption puts an upper bound on the inefficiency of taxation. If we do not impose it, the government’s 
optimal tax rate does not change but the amount of public good provided becomes 
)} ( ), 1 ( {
* 1 * G G G R H Max g  
    which may entail some rationing.   13
the incumbent party receive private rents, to the public good versus the private transfer 
would depend on the relative expected vote returns from the two types of instruments. 
The incumbent would attempt to find the cheapest possible strategy to win the minimum 
swing votes needed. The paper examines decentralization as a strategic political 
instrument in this context. 
The first critical assumption we make to build the argument is that the vote return 
from shifting resources at the margin to targeted transfers to some swing voters is greater 
than the vote return from increasing the public good, at the preferred public good level of 
the incumbent. That is, 
s
s G s G
f
f g H F
g





  ) ) ( ( ) ) ( (
* *
  
 If the incumbent party chooses to seek re-election, it would provide private 
transfers to swing voters just up to the point where it meets the reelection constraint. The 
constrained optimal amount of private transfers to swing voters for a government seeking 
re-election is therefore given by 
* s f  where     )) ) ( (
* * s G f g H F . The government 
would attempt to finance the provision of these transfers, by diverting tax revenues 
collected through its preferred rate 
G *   from rents for its constituents. Assuming 
sufficient revenues, the central politician would continue to keep the tax rate at 
G *  , 
provide 
G g
* , but would reduce the targeted rents to its constituents to 
* * * * s G G j f r r   .  
As mentioned at the outset in the paper, Lizzeri and Persico (2004) use 
completely opposite assumptions, of the increasing value of the public good to pivotal 
voters in post-industrial revolution England, to explain how suffrage reforms led to 
substantial increases in spending by municipal corporations on public health and 
sanitation infrastructure. The micro evidence on voting behavior in poor countries, 
however, suggests that small private transfers provided within a quid pro quo 
arrangement may bring surer vote returns to parties than broad provision of public goods.   
Finan and Schechter (2010) explore the role of social preferences such as 
reciprocity, the psychological pressure to return a favor received from someone, in 
shaping electoral strategies of vote buying. Combining experimental games that measure 
the strength of reciprocal feelings among individuals with survey data on vote-buying   14
offers made to individuals in the country of Paraguay, they find that political agents 
target vote buying to individuals with greater feelings of reciprocity. A large literature on 
get-out-the-vote campaigns in the US finds that personal or direct contact with 
households are the most persuasive in getting them to vote on election day, compared to 
other strategies that are more broadly targeted, such as distributing pamphlets 
(DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2009).  
This argument might logically extend to comparing the marginal vote-returns 
from spending on broad public goods versus privately targeted transfers—broadly 
provided public goods might not generate the same strength of reciprocal feelings in 
individual voters as do private, one-to-one transfers. Even when an incumbent 
government provides broad public goods, voters that are targeted with private benefits 
from a rival party might still vote against the incumbent. Political studies of vote-buying, 
largely concentrated in Latin America and in poorer constituencies in the US, have 
provided theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence that low-income or poor 
voters are more likely to be targeted with vote-buying offers, and more likely to comply 
(Harding, 2008; Stokes, 2005; Brusco et al, 2004).  
Others have argued for countries like India that since the poor live at or near 
subsistence levels they are more likely to reward with a vote even a small welfare transfer 
made directly to their household rather than broad performance in the delivery of public 
goods (Varshney, 2000; Acharya, 2004). Their private voting action may therefore be at 
odds with their publicly declared preferences for public goods, such as when they answer 
questions about priority problems for the village where they invariably mention village 
infrastructure (Banerjee et al, 2007). Bardhan et al (2008) included a secret ballot in their 
survey of rural households in West Bengal to examine the correlates of voting for the 
incumbent Left Front political parties. They find that an individual household’s vote for 
the incumbent party is significantly correlated only with private and recurring benefits 
received, in the form of personal help in times of need or benefits from welfare schemes, 
and not with the availability of local infrastructure. 
Decentralization under heterogeneity of preferences? Within this political 
economy framework, would a central political incumbent choose to decentralize the   15
authority to raise revenues under the standard technical rationale for decentralization—
heterogeneity of preferences over public goods? Suppose there are n localities such that  
) (g H
n   varies across n, that is the marginal utility from the public good varies across 
localities. Under the assumption that  g  is divisible into 
n g  (such as schools, health 
centers etc.), benevolent decentralization by a central social planner would involve the 
creation of n local governments, and decentralization of decision-making to these local 
governments over
n g and 
n  . Benevolent local governments would in turn select local 
levels of taxation to finance locally preferred levels of the public good. However, such 
decentralization involves giving-up taxation rights by the central incumbent, and risks 
greater tax rates and redistribution to rival interest groups by rival political parties that 
come into power at local levels. For such decentralization to happen, it would need 
conditions on the likelihood of the ruling political party controlling local governments, as 
in the analysis of O’Neill (2003). 
Decentralization under local vote mobilization? Now suppose local elections 
enable the identification of local leaders with social networks within which vote buying is 
more effective than through centralized “party machines”. This is the second critical 
assumption for the arguments offered in this paper.  
Consider the following form of decentralization—1) announcement of the 
decentralization of local grants,  )) ( , 0 (  R D
n  , determined for each locality at the 
discretion of the central government for poverty alleviation programs for which the 
beneficiaries will be identified by locally elected governments; 2) local elections occur to 
select the candidate who will subsequently determine 
nj f ,  S j , 2 , 1  ; the outcome of the 
first local elections is determined by a coin toss; 3) the locally elected leader  receives 
n D , and allocates it to 
nj f to maximize the utility of his/her core supporters subject to a 
budget and re-election constraint.
11  
                                                 
11 Tax decentralization is not an option because it would lead to loss of central incumbent control over the 
revenues collected by opposition party local governments.   16
First, under decentralization, in equilibrium  0  G n
n D for those localities where 
the citizen-candidate who wins elections belongs to the opposition party.
12 To determine 
grants to the localities where its party affiliates win office, the central incumbent party 
goes through the following exercise—it first chooses its unconstrained (by re-election) 
most preferred tax rate and public good level; it then estimates how many swing votes it 
can get with its preferred level of public goods, and how many more it needs to win re-
election. If it has sufficient swing votes at its preferred policy, there is no benefit from 
decentralization.  
If the swing votes are not sufficient,    )) ( (
*G g H F , the central politician could 
provide grants  )] ( ) ( [
* 1 * G
G n
n g H F D D   

    to its affiliated localities to buy votes 
through direct transfers to those swing voters, 
s *  ,whose reservation utility is given by 
) ( ) (
* * 1 G g H F  
   . These swing voters cast their vote in the next elections (both 




s g H F
f
*







Assuming sufficient revenues, the central politician would continue to keep the 
tax rate at 
G *  , provide 
G g
* , but would reduce the targeted rents to its constituents to 
G G DG j D r r
* *   .  
What would the local politicians belonging to the group 
G   do upon receiving 
grants 
n D ? Since their objective is the same as the incumbent political party G, to 
maximize the utility of core constituents subject to a re-election constraint, they will 
spend the entire grant on buying the swing votes needed for their party to win office both 
locally and centrally.
14 
                                                 
12  The actions of the state government of Andhra Pradesh in India in the late 1990s have been interpreted 
in this light—because the elected leaders of village governments were not aligned with the state ruling 
party, the state party bypassed these local governments and gave program transfers directly to other forms 
of community organization, user committees, that it was better able to control (Powis, 2003; Manor, 2004).  
13 We assume at this point that the number of localities 
G n  is sufficient to contain the 
s *   swing voters. 
14 The local party leader receives the group-targeted transfers and shares in the general benefits of his/her 
party holding office.   17
If local elected leaders are more efficient and effective at identifying and winning 
the cheapest swing votes than local party operatives, then the local spending needed to 
win the minimum swing votes would be less than the additional transfers provided by 
party operatives (in the absence of decentralization): 
* * s G f D   
Decentralization of grants for beneficiary selection of targeted transfers would 
therefore be selected by the central political incumbent if it were cheaper to buy votes 
from the poorest voters through the advantages of local-election vote mobilization than 
through centralized party machines.  
Under such political capture of decentralization, it may well be that comparing 
central versus local targeting performance in the distribution of welfare programs shows 
that local targeting is more pro-poor; however, the cost of decentralization might lie in 
the ability of the political party to continue winning office with lower progressive 
taxation and investment in public goods than would have been possible in the face of the 
demands of swing voters. This framework therefore suggests a new type of “swing 
voter’s curse” than is available in the literature (Robinson and Torvik, 2009; Feddersen 
and Pesendorfer, 1996). The more demanding swing voters become for broad public 
good, the less likely they are to receive their preferred levels because central politicians 
would use the means of vote buying in local elections to divide the strength of swing 
voters, targeting those that can be bought most cheaply, and win elections at lower levels 
of progressive taxes and public goods (than without well targeted vote buying). 
The framework may be extended to allow for heterogeneity in distribution of 
groups across localities, and to allow for other interest groups to emerge at local levels. 
This might lead to results on the fragmentation of jurisdictions. Depending on how 
groups are distributed geographically, the central politician might choose to further sub-
divide existing local jurisdictions into smaller units where votes are easier or cheaper to 
purchase. 
The key intuition here is that beginning with a standard workhorse model of 
partisan policy objectives makes it difficult to find conditions under which a ruling party 
would choose to decentralize revenue raising authority. Decentralization would be 
consistent within this model under assumptions of differential political support for parties   18
in local versus central elections, or as grants-based decentralization driven by greater 
effectiveness of vote mobilization in local elections.
15  
3. Evidence on characteristics of local jurisdictions 
This section provides evidence from several countries around the world of 
characteristics of local jurisdictions that is consistent with the implications of a theory of 
political capture of decentralization explored above. The purpose here is to show that the 
proposed theory has empirical or practical relevance, rather than to formally test 
predictions. 
Table 1 provides some data on characteristics of local jurisdictions in selected 
countries. These countries have been selected on the basis of available reports on the 
nature of decentralization to local jurisdictions. There is little systematic data available on 
fiscal characteristics of local jurisdictions such as villages, municipalities, and districts. 
The main source of comparable cross-country data employed in the literature on sub-
national finance is the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database compiled by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); but although this provides reasonably reliable 
estimates of finances of states, regions, or provinces, it is widely acknowledged as not 
reliable for measuring finances of the lower level jurisdictions which are the focus of this 
paper.  
For this paper, detailed reports on local government finances were located for 
several large countries spread across four major regions of the world. There is clear 
evidence from three large countries, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria, where responsibility 
for public service delivery is being increasingly decentralized to local governments, that 
such decentralized spending is financed by fiscal grants from higher tiers. The average 
share of own-source revenue in the total revenues managed by local jurisdictions in these 
three countries is less than or barely equal to 10 percent. This average in fact masks even 
higher dependence on grants by the majority of local jurisdictions in these countries. In 
Nigeria, for example, a detailed survey of local government finances in the rural state of 
Kogi finds that own revenues are only 1-2 percent of total revenues managed by rural 
                                                 
15 Even with such local political differences, decentralization to locally elected governments might be 
trumped by other strategies of centralized targeting of local precincts of central electoral districts.    19
local governments (Khemani, 2006a). In another country included in Table 1, the 
Philippines, although the average share of own-revenues is 14 percent, the share in the 
median municipality is 10 percent, and more than a quarter raise less than 5 percent of 
their total income from local sources.  
Municipalities in Peru, the country with the highest share of own revenues among 
those included in Table 1, have been characterized by some analysts as having no 
discretion over local rate setting and tax collection, and effectively being fully financed 
by central grants (Ahmad and Garcia-Escribano, 2006).
16 Even this relatively high share 
of own revenues, at 27 percent, is comparable to the very lowest of such shares among 
OECD countries. Ambrosanio and Bordignon (2006) provide statistics on the share of 
grants in local government revenues in the 20 OECD countries, which shows that only 3 
countries had a grants share greater than 55 percent—Ireland at 76 percent, and the 
Netherlands and UK at 70 percent. This OECD experience shows that even in the face of 
theoretical arguments in favor of grants financed decentralization, in which taxes can be 
collected more efficiently at national levels and then distributed to sub-nationals as 
grants, grants dependence is not in the realm of 80 or 90 percent of local revenues as in 
the countries listed in Table 1. Within the developing world, countries in the Latin 
American region appear to have a smaller share of municipal spending financed by 
grants, but even these are higher than in most OECD countries. In Brazil and Mexico 
grants constitute 67 and 64 percent of municipal revenues (Burki et al, 1999).  
Grants dependence in these countries appears to go hand in hand with small size 
of local jurisdictions (in terms of population and area), and re-drawing of jurisdiction 
boundaries or growth in number of jurisdictions over time. Although the average 
population size of local jurisdictions is higher in Latin America than in Europe, this 
average appears to be masking large disparities across jurisdictions. Burki et al (1999) 
find that the vast majority of municipalities in the region have fewer than 15,000 
residents. Burki et al (1999) also report shrinking in jurisdiction size, with the number of 
                                                 
16 Some have argued that Peru should not be considered a decentralized country at all. Indeed, prior to 2002 
spending by municipalities hardly accounted for a significant share of government spending. However, 
since 2002, the share of municipal spending has risen to 13 percent and is expected to increase further. For 
the purposes of this paper, the issue of interest is that even as the country moves towards greater 
decentralization of spending, it chooses national grants to finance it.    20
municipios in Brazil increasing from 3000 to nearly 5000 in the fifteen years following 
the return to democracy in the country. In Venezuela, they report the number of 
municipios increasing from 202 to 330 within a decade. In a presidential address in 
Nigeria in 2003, then President Obasanjo indicated that state governments in the country 
were in the process of creating more than 500 new local governments, a 65 percent 
increase over the existing 774 listed in the country’s 1999 Constitution.
17  
In a review of international evidence on the distribution of grants across 
jurisdictions, Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2005) find an inverse relation between 
jurisdiction size and per-capita grants, that is, smaller jurisdictions tend to receive larger 
grants per capita across a range of countries. This pattern is consistent with the theory of 
political capture of decentralization offered here, and resonates with recent lessons from 
field experience. Examples have been provided in the Philippines of re-drawing of 
boundaries of municipalities and barangays (villages), or conversion of barangays into 
municipalities, to enable local political families to gain access to grants from higher tiers 
of government.
18 Burki et al (1999) have also observed that demand for the creation of 
new jurisdictions is driven by the system of intergovernmental grants in many countries. 
Local requests for new jurisdictions typically have to be passed by the national or 
provincial legislatures, and the theory of political capture of decentralization is consistent 
with higher tier authorities granting these requests to facilitate vote buying. 
Although in many of the countries discussed thus far, a large chunk of grants 
distribution across local jurisdictions is determined by criteria set out in national 
constitutions, or a legal decree governing decentralization, there is evidence of significant 
political manipulation in targeting grants on the basis of local electoral characteristics. 
Reviews of international evidence are provided in Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2005) 
and Khemani (2006b). Another striking feature in several countries is the provision of 
specific spending programs to local jurisdictions by higher-tier politicians, separate from 
and outside of the regular channels of intergovernmental grants. India, the Philippines, 
and Kenya have recently launched programs that are generally termed “constituency 
                                                 
17 Google search result on a national broadcast by President Olusegun Obasanjo in Abuja, Nigeria, on June 
18, 2003, titled “On the Issue of the Review of the Structure of Governance in Nigeria”. 
18 Descriptions provided to the author during field visits to municipalities in the Philippines in October 
2008. No documentation of such changes has been accessible to date.   21
development funds” (CDFs) which allow individual national or state legislators to 
provide funds for local public infrastructure investment.  
Most, if not all, of the literature on inter-governmental fiscal and political 
relations in the Philippines emphasizes the importance of congressional, gubernatorial, 
and even presidential pork-barrel projects for city and municipal politics. De Dios (2007) 
and Rocamora (2008) argue that one of the two main pillars of local political contests in 
the Philippines is the generation of funds and projects from higher tier governments.
19 In 
on-going field work in the Philippines, in every municipality visited, respondents 
describe the importance of political affiliation of local mayors to provincial governors 
and national congressman in attracting spending programs to their jurisdiction (Khemani 
and Matsuda, 2008). 
In India, resources are transferred to local governments largely in the form of 
“schemes” for poverty alleviation, and the primary decentralized local responsibility is 
that of identifying beneficiaries. Such decentralization has been viewed in the literature 
as good policy design, in the face of solid evidence of informational advantages of local 
governments in appropriately identifying the poor or those that have faced particularly 
negative economic shocks (Alderman, 2002). However, the arguments in this paper imply 
that such schemes-based decentralization might lead to clientelist local politics.  
Analysis of perverse political incentives at local levels in India has focused 
overwhelmingly on the risk of “capture” of public resources by local elite for their own 
benefit, systematically excluding poor and disadvantaged people (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2000, 2002; Baland and Platteau, 1999). The alternate hypothesis posited 
here is that even if such specified “elite capture” is not salient, and poor and 
disadvantaged groups are politically mobilized, their incentives are to demand short-term 
private benefits from local governments charged with beneficiary selection for poverty 
alleviation schemes.  
The existence of historical institutions of social inequality in India makes it a 
setting from which much evidence has been garnered on relative “capture” by local 
governments. We review this evidence below to argue that it is equally consistent with 
                                                 
19 The other being the control of illegal economic activity such as gambling and smuggling.   22
political mobilization of disadvantaged groups to demand private goods targeted to 
members of their “group”, at the expense of broad public goods from which all group 
members would benefit. 
Besley et al (2004) focus on analyzing distribution of access to poverty alleviation 
schemes, a BPL (Below Poverty Line) card, by village governments (panchayats) in 
India. They find that legally identified disadvantaged groups, households belonging to the 
scheduled castes and tribes (SC/STs), are more likely to receive a BPL card and/or 
targeted home improvement schemes (toilets, drinking water, electricity, repairs) when 
the elected position of head of the village government, the Gram Pradhan, is reserved for 
members of SC/ST groups.  
They also find that a second institutional feature of decentralization in India—the 
requirement of village-wide meetings, the Gram Sabhas, to deliberate upon allocations of 
public funds reaching local governments—enables targeting of public benefits to 
disadvantaged groups. Specifically, they find that if a village is the kind of village that 
holds a Gram Sabha, then disadvantaged households are more likely to participate in it 
than are advantaged households, and they are simultaneously more likely to receive BPL 
cards.  
It is important to note that the impact of political reservations and Gram Sabhas is 
additional to overall targeting of BPL cards to disadvantaged households. That is, in 
general, in all villages a household that is SC/ST, or landless, or poor along other 
measurable dimensions, is more likely to receive a BPL card than upper caste or richer 
households, and they are even more likely to be thus targeted when a village has political 
reservations and holds Gram Sabhas.   
Besley et al (2004) interpret this as evidence of appropriate targeting of 
disadvantaged groups when political decentralization is accompanied by institutional 
mechanism (political reservations, Gram Sabhas) to combat entrenched inequalities. 
However, this evidence is equally consistent with the arguments in this paper that 
schemes-based or grants-financed local governments would emphasize the delivery of 
targeted private benefits to citizens. Bardhan et al (2008) contribute recent evidence from 
the state of West Bengal in India that voters cite short-term private benefits received from   23
their local governments as most important for their voting decision and support of 
incumbents, as opposed to longer-term policy initiatives taken by incumbents to promote 
general public goods.  They also find little evidence of political marginalization or 
political exclusion of weaker socio-economic groups.
20  
Some evidence on incentives of politicians representing disadvantaged groups to 
exert effort on public service delivery to their constituents is provided by Keefer and 
Khemani (2009) who examine a CDF in India (mentioned above)—the Member of 
Parliament Local Area Development Scheme. This scheme entitles every member of the 
national parliament, elected from single-member constituencies, to substantial resources 
to spend on local public infrastructure in their districts. They find that dominant 
incumbents from districts that are reserved for SC/STs, that is, SC/ST politicians who 
have been elected for several consecutive terms, spend 14 percentage points less of their 
entitlement than other politicians. In short, dominant incumbents from reserved districts 
are not dominant because they exert great effort in providing public infrastructure to their 
constituents. Their dominance likely comes from other kinds of private identity-based 
services. 
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) also provide evidence consistent with Bardhan et 
al’s argument that voters place greater emphasis in local elections in India on short-term 
gains from public spending. They focus on 3 categories of public goods which together 
account for 73 percent of the activities of village governments in their sample in India—
roads, irrigation, and schools.  They find that villages with democratically elected 
governments are more likely to provide more of all three public goods, but the largest 
effect is for irrigation, as calculated at the sample average, which is the service most 
likely to benefit the rural elite. However, in villages with a very high proportion of 
landless (much above the sample average) public investment shifts from irrigation to road 
construction (rather than education, which is unaffected by proportion landless), which 
suggests that capture by elites can be ameliorated when the numerical strength of the poor 
increases, but in a manner that might not be the most efficient for extending benefits to 
the poor.  Roads built by village governments primarily benefit the poor, but largely by 
                                                 
20 The only groups with low participation identified by Bardhan et al (2008) are immigrants, women, and 
those with low education, not low caste groups or low income/wealth groups.   24
raising their (short-term) wages, as local road construction and improvement initiatives in 
India serve as employment programs for the landless poor.  Education, which one expects 
to have the most profound effect on poverty over the medium and long-term, seems least 
affected by decentralization. 
New evidence from India specifically on decentralization of education services 
further illustrates this point (Banerjee et al, 2007). A central plank of public policy for 
improving primary education services in India is the participation of Village Education 
Committees (VECs) which were created in the 1990s, consisting of the head of the 
elected village government, parents, and public school teachers. In a survey of 280 
villages in India’s most populous and educationally challenged state, Uttar Pradesh, in 
March 2005, at least 10 years after the formal creation of this agency, Banerjee et al 
(2006) find that parents do not know that a VEC exists, sometimes even when they are 
supposed to be members of it; VEC members are unaware of even key roles they are 
empowered to play in education services; public participation in improving education is 
negligible, and correspondingly, people’s ranking of education on a list of village 
priorities is low. Large numbers of children in the villages have not acquired basic 
competency in reading, writing, and arithmetic. Yet, parents, teachers, and VEC members 
seem not to be fully aware of the scale of the problem, and seem not to have given much 
thought to the role of public agencies in improving outcomes. That is, school failures 
coexist with local apathy to improving it through local public action. 
Between September and December 2005, an Indian NGO, Pratham, intervened in 
195 of the 280 villages surveyed with different types of information and advocacy 
campaigns that communicated to village citizens the status of learning among their 
children, and the potential role that VECs and local governments could play in improving 
learning. The basic format of the interventions was to organize a village meeting on 
education, with the attendance of the head of the local village government and the head 
teacher of the village public school, the key members of the VEC, from whom the village 
community is urged to ask and receive basic information about local agencies in primary 
education. The issue raised most frequently in the village meetings, and about which 
people were most animated, was a government scholarship program intended to provide 
cash assistance to students from SC/ST groups. SC/ST parents complained that they were   25
not getting these scholarships, whilst teachers complained that parents inappropriately 
enroll under-age children, that can’t and don’t attend school, just to lay claim to the 
scholarships. The second issue that attracted attention was a new government mid-day 
meal program. Actual learning levels attracted the least attention, and the facilitators had 
a difficult time steering the conversation away from scholarships and school meals to the 
broader issue of learning.  
Follow-up surveys were undertaken in the same 280 villages in March 2006, 3-6 
months after the information campaigns were implemented, and the most surprising fact 
emerging is that the campaigns did not lead to any substantial improvement in citizens’ 
lack of knowledge of VECs. Less than 10 percent of citizens are aware of the VECs both 
before and after the interventions. We also find no effect on public school performance. 
This contrasts with a dramatic increase in private efforts to improve learning of lagging 
children in response to information provided—local youth volunteered to hold additional 
classes outside school, parents of illiterate children in particular chose to participate in 
these classes, and consequently the children made great strides towards literacy. 
However, we don’t even have anecdotal evidence that these local volunteers were 
assisted in their efforts by local government structures—neither the village government 
head, nor the village public school teacher, nor any member of the VEC. Indeed, 
according to anecdotes provided by Pratham’s facilitators in the field, the public school 
teacher and the Pradhan in some villages felt threatened by the volunteer activities and 
attention drawn to learning failures in public schools. 
4. Implications for international development assistance 
Much of the reforms being pursued by donors in support of decentralization 
consist of providing greater revenues or transfers, and building capacity of local 
governments through training programs such as in public financial management. The 
arguments here suggest that these reforms on their own might not be efficient or effective 
in delivering improved public services for actual development outcomes, if the local 
jurisdictions being supported are politically captured. Greater funds devolved to local 
governments are more likely to go towards clientelist transfers rather than improvement 
of public goods. Capacity building can be a waste when local politicians have no 
incentives to develop technocratic skills for better service delivery.    26
One of the governance strategies being pursued in international development 
assistance to improve the impact of decentralization is termed community-driven 
development (CDD) in which communities are mobilized to identify their preferred 
projects and to participate in their implementation. The hypothesized governance impact 
of this strategy is greater social cohesion, and enhanced ability of citizens to demand and 
receive better public goods performance from their governments. Another is conditional 
cash transfers (CCT) where households are mandated to access public health and/or 
education services in order to receive cash transfers. The governance impact of this 
strategy is hypothesized to be an increase in citizen demand for public health and 
education services which in turn strengthens political incentives to improve the quality of 
these broad public goods. Although there are several evaluations planned, underway, or 
completed, on the impact of CDD and CCT programs on their directly targeted outcomes, 
such as project quality and beneficiary household-level welfare outcomes, none are 
designed sufficiently rigorously to assess their impact on local public goods or local 
political incentives (to the best of the author’s knowledge).
21 This is a serious gap in the 
policy research literature that should be addressed. 
Another governance intervention which has not been widely experimented with, 
that may be used in concert with CDD and CCT interventions or alone, is to promote 
yardstick competition on service delivery performance by regularly and systematically 
providing independent, credible, and objective information to citizens and public officials 
about relative performance across jurisdictions. Part of the problem of clientelist local 
politics might be lack of independent data and expert analysis available to civil society to 
judge relative performance across local jurisdictions.  New empirical methodologies can 
be used to fill this gap by measuring service delivery outcomes that are representative at 
the level of local jurisdictions in feasible and cost effective ways. Once measured, the 
outcomes can be compiled as “municipal report cards” and disseminated to attempt to 
promote yardstick competition over performance improvements.  
                                                 
21 Labonne and Chase (2008) make an attempt to assess impact of a CDD project on local governance in 
the Philippines, but do not appear to have useful governance outcome variables. The variable on which they 
do find impact—number of village meetings organized by local officials, and household participation in 
these meetings—is a requirement for a village to access the CDD project, and hence automatically expected 
to be higher in CDD villages because of the nature of program implementation.   27
Brazil provides some examples of successful experiences with this type of 
governance intervention. Tendler (1997) describes how the politics of patronage in 
municipal governments in the state of Ceara in Brazil was tackled head-on through 
massive information campaigns by a state government that took office in 1987. The state 
government flooded radio airwaves with messages about how infant and child mortality 
could be drastically reduced through particular programs of municipal governments, thus 
bringing political pressure to bear upon the mayors to actually deliver basic health 
services. The state also created a new class of public health workers through a publicized 
recruitment effort that conveyed information to communities about the valuable role the 
workers could play in improving public health through community-wide effort. In only a 
few years coverage of measles and polio vaccination in Ceara tripled to 90 percent of the 
child population, and infant deaths fell from 102 to 65 per thousand births. The 
campaigns’ success has been attributed to bringing a remarkable turnaround in the 
politics of the state—from clientelist and patronage-based to service-oriented (Tendler, 
1997). 
More recently, Brazil has been the source of another innovative experiment in 
reducing local political rent-seeking by generating and providing credible information to 
citizens. In May 2003 the national government of Brazil launched an anti-corruption 
program based on the random auditing of municipal government expenditures by an 
independent public agency, and then publicly releasing audit findings on the internet and 
to media sources.
22 New evidence from more than 600 municipalities covered by the 
audit suggests that the disclosure of information significantly and substantially reduced 
the re-election rates of mayors who were found to be corrupt (Ferraz and Finan, 2006). 
Furthermore, this impact was significantly more pronounced in municipalities with 
greater access to radio stations. 
More generally, there is a role for greater measurement and monitoring of citizen 
expectations and demands from government, what policy issues they choose to organize 
for, to identify new ways in which collective action can be nudged towards broad public 
                                                 
22 In Portuguese, this program is called Programa de Fiscaliza¸c˜ao a partir de Sorteios P´ublicos, details 
of which is available from the following website: www.presidencia.gov.br/cgu. 
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goods. More work is needed to identify innovative institutional design or conditions 
under which political capture is reduced and accountability for local public goods 
increases. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has examined a theory of decentralization as a political choice of 
national or provincial leaders to combat growing demands of swing voters for broad 
public goods, and to continue targeting private benefits to organized interest groups. 
Decentralization to new local jurisdictions may be subject to political capture, enabling 
politicians to buy votes from some swing voters while continuing to provide targeted 
benefits to their core constituents and to under-provide broad public goods. Local 
governments in the political capture model are financed entirely by grants, and spend it 
on targeted transfers to poor voters in exchange for their vote, at the expense of local 
public goods.  
The paper provides examples from several large countries of the developing 
world of decentralization to small local jurisdictions, financed almost entirely by grants 
or spending programs received from higher tiers of government, as evidence of the 
empirical relevance of its theory. It also reviews evidence of the importance of 
clientelism in local politics, in these same countries where grants finance small local 
jurisdictions, which further supports the conclusions derived under a theory of political 
capture of decentralization. 
The aim of this analysis is to strike a note of caution for well-intentioned 
reformers who are attempting to implement participatory local government in political 
economy contexts that are inimical to organization of citizens for the broad public 
interest. By bringing to the fore the tension between citizen mobilization for private or 
group-targeted benefits versus the greater public interest, this work suggests the value of 
experimenting with other types of complementary governance interventions designed to 
overcome political constraints to broad public goods.  
    29
References 
Ahmad, E. and M. Garcia-Escribano. 2006. “Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sub-
national Financial Management in Peru, IMF Working Paper, WP/06/120, IMF, 
Washington DC 
Aiyer, Mani Shankar, 2009. “Inclusive Growth Through Inclusive Governance,” 
Conference Paper, Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Decentralization Task Force 
Meeting, Columbia University, New York 
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/Aiyar_inclusive_growth.pdf 
Alderman, H. 2002. “Do local officials know something we don’t? Decentralization of 
targeted transfers in Albania,” Journal of Public Economics, 83(3): 375-404. 
Ambrosanio, M. F. and M. Bordignon, 2006. “Normative versus positive theories of 
revenue assignments in federations,” In E. Ahmad and G. Brosio (Eds.) 
Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK 
Baland, Jean Marie and Jean-Philippe Platteau, 1999. The Ambiguous Impact of 
Inequality on Local Resource Management.” World Development 27(5): 773-88 
Banerjee, A., R. Banerji, E. Duflo, R. Glennerster, and S. Khemani, 2010. “Pitfalls of 
Participatory Programs: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in education in 
India,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(1): 1-30. 
Banerjee, A., R. Banerji, E. Duflo, R. Glennerster, D. Keniston, S. Khemani, and M. 
Shotland. 2007. “Can Information Campaigns Raise Awareness and Local 
Participation in Primary Education?” Economic and Political Weekly, April 14, 
42(15): 1365-1372 
Bardhan, P., S. Mitra, D. Mookherjee, and A. Sarkar, 2007. “Local Democracy in Rural 
West Bengal: Political Participation and Targeting of Public Services”, Working 
Paper, UC-Berkeley, Department of Economics 
Bardhan, Pranab, and Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. “Decentralizing antipoverty program 
delivery in developing countries”, Journal of Public Economics, 89: 675-704   30
Bardhan, P. 2002. “Decentralization of Governance and Development.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 16(4): 185-205. 
Bardhan, Pranab, and Dilip Mookherjee, 2000. “Capture and Governance at Local and 
National Levels.” American Economic Review, 90(2): 135-39 
Besley, Timothy, Rohini Pande, Lupin Rahman, and Vijayendra Rao, 2004. “The Politics 
of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments.” Journal of 
the European Economic Association, April-May 2004 
Besley, T. and S. Coate, 2003. “Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public 
goods: a political economy approach,” Journal of Public Economics, 87: 2611-37. 
Besley, T. and A. Case. 1995. “Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and 
Yardstick Competition”, American Economic Review, 85(1): 25-45 
Boex, J. and J. Martinez-Vazquez. 2005. “The determinants of the incidence of 
international grants: a survey of the international experience”, Working Paper 05-
09, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, 
Georgia 
Breton, A. 1996. Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public 
Finance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Brusco, V., M. Nazareno and S. Stokes. 2004. “Vote Buying in Argentina." Latin 
American Research Review, 39(2):66-88. 
Burki, Shaid Javed, Guillermo Perry, and William Dillinger 1999. Beyond the Center: 
Decentralizing the State. World Bank: Washington, D.C. 
Chaudhuri, S. 2006. “What difference does a constitutional amendment make? The 1994 
Panchayati Raj Act and the attempt to revitalize rural local government in India”, 
in P. Bardhan and D. Mookherjee (Eds.), Decentralization and Local Governance 
in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA   31
Coronel, S., Y. Chua, L. Rimban, and B. Cruz, 2004. The Rulemakers: how the wealthy 
and well born dominate Congress, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 
Manila, Philippines 
Cremer, J. and T. Palfrey. 1996. “In or out? Centralization by majority vote”, European 
Economic Review, 40, pp. 43-60. 
De Dios, Emmanuel. 2007. “Local Politics and Local Economy”, In Arsenio M. 
Balisacan and Hal Hill (Eds.) The Dynamics of Regional Development – The 
Philippines in East Asia, Ateneo De Manila University Press, Manila, Philippines 
Dickovick, J. T. 2007. “Municipalization as Central Government Strategy: Central-
Regional-Local Politics in Peru, Brazil, and South Africa,” Publius: The Journal 
of Federalism, 37(1): 1-25. 
Ferraz, C. and F. Finan. 2008. “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: the effect of Brazil’s 
publicly released audits on electoral outcomes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
123(2): 703-745. 
Finan, F. and L. Schechter. 2010. “Vote-buying and reciprocity,” Mimeo, Department of 
Economics, University of California—Berkeley, Berkeley, USA 
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~ffinan/Finan_VB.pdf 
Foster, A. and M. Rosenzweig 2001. “Democratization, Decentralization, and the 
Distribution of Local Public Goods in a Poor Rural Economy.” Working Paper, 
Brown University, http://adfdell.pstc.brown.edu/papers/democ.pdf. 
Harding, Robin. 2008. “Vote Buying Across Africa.” Mimeo. Department of Political 
Science, New York University 
Keefer, P. and S. Khemani, 2008. “Why do some legislators pass on “pork”? The role of 
political parties in determining legislator effort,” American Political Science 
Review, Forthcoming 
Khemani, S. and W. Wane. 2008. “Populist Fiscal Policy”, Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 4762, Development Research Group, The World Bank, Washington 
DC   32
Khemani, S. 2007. “Does Delegation of Fiscal Policy to an Independent Agency Make a 
Difference? Evidence from Intergovernmental Transfers in India,” Journal of 
Development Economics, 82(2): 464-484 
Khemani, S. 2006a. “Local Government Accountability for Health Service Delivery in 
Nigeria”, Journal of African Economies, June 2006, 15(2): 285-312 
Khemani, S. 2006b. “The Political Economy of Fiscal Equalization Transfers.” In Fiscal 
Capacity Equalization and Intergovernmental Transfers, Edited by Roy Bahl, 
Jorge Martinez and Robert Searle, Springer Publications, New York, NY 
Labonne, J. and R. Chase. 2008. “Do community-driven development projects enhance 
social capital? Evidence from the Philippines,” Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 4678, Development Research Group, The World Bank, Washington DC 
Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico, 2004. “Why did the elites extend the suffrage? Democracy 
and the scope of government, with an application to Britain’s ‘Age of Reform’,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2): 707-765 
Lockwood, B. 2004. “Decentralization via federal and unitary referenda”, Journal of 
Public Economic Theory, 6, pp. 313-337. 
Lockwood, B. 2002. “Distributive politics and the costs of centralization,” Review of 
Economic Studies, 69(2): 313-37. 
Manor, J. 2004. “User Committees: A potentially damaging second wave of 
decentralization?” Special Spring 2004 issue of European Journal of 
Development Research, eds. J. C. Ribot and A.M. Larson, Volume 16, Number 1, 
Chapter 11 
Mendes, Marcos, Rogério Miranda and Fernando Blanco, 2008. “Intergovernmental 
Transfers in Brazil,” Mimeo, The World Bank, Washington DC 
Oates. W. 1972. Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt-Brace 
Oberholzer-Gee, F. and K. S. Strumpf. 2002. “Endogenous Policy Decentralization: 
Testing the central tenet of economic federalism”, Journal of Political Economy, 
110, pp. 1-36   33
O’Neill, K. 2003. “Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy,” Comparative Political 
Studies, 36(9): 1068-1091. 
Panizza, U. 1999. “On the determinants of fiscal centralization: theory and evidence”, 
Journal of Public Economics, 74: 97-140 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Public 
Policy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 
Powis, B (2003). “Grass Roots Politics and the “Second Wave of Decentralisation” in 
Andhra Pradesh.” Economic & Political Weekly (June 28
th) 
Redoano, M. and K. Scharf. 2004. “The political economy of policy centralization: direct 
versus representative democracy”, Journal of Public Economics, 88, pp. 799-817. 
Rodden, J., 2002. “The dilemma of fiscal federalism: intergovernmental grants and fiscal 
performance around the world.” American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 
670-687  
Sanchez de Lozada, 2000. Letter to Mr. Eduardo Aninat. 
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/SanchezLozada.pdf 
Seabright, S. 1996. “Accountability and decentralization in government: an incomplete 
contracts model,” European Economic Review, 40: 61-91. 
Sidel, J. T. 1999. Capital, Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines, Stanford 
University Press: Palo Alto, CA 
Stokes, Susan. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with 
Evidence from Argentina." American Political Science Review, 99(03):315-325. 
Tendler, J. 1997. Good Government in the Tropics, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, MD 
Tiebout, C. M. 1956. “A pure theory of local expenditures”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 65(5): 416-24 
Varshney, A. 2005. “Democracy and Poverty,” In Deepa Narayan (Ed.) Measuring 
Empowerment, The World Bank, Washington DC   34
Varshney, Ashutosh, 2000. “Why have poor democracies not eliminated poverty?” Asian 
Survey Vol XL, No. 5, September/October 2000, 718-736 
 
Weingast, B. 1995. “The economic role of political institutions: market-preserving 
federalism and economic growth”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 
11: 1-31. 
World Bank. 2008. Spending for Development: Making the Most of Indonesia’s New 
Opportunities, Indonesia Public Expenditure Review, The World Bank, 
Washington DC 
World Bank. 2003. Restoring Fiscal Discipline for Poverty Reduction in Peru: A Public 
Expenditure Review, The World Bank, Washington DC     35
Table 1: 
Local Government Characteristics in Selected Countries 
  Local Jurisdictions  Share of Local Own-Revenues in 
Total Revenues 
India 
~500 districts, ~6000 blocks, 
>230,000 villages 
(Rural Local Bodies) 
3.7%
 a 
Indonesia  440 Districts and Cities  8.8%
 b 
Nigeria  >770 Local Government 
Authorities  10%
 c 
Peru  ~1700 district municipalities  27%
 d 
The Philippines  ~1500 municipalities  14%
 e 
a.  Source: Choudhuri (2006)  
b.  Source: World Bank (2008) 
c.  Source: Author’s own calculations from data provided by Central Bank of Nigeria, 1999 
d.  Source: World Bank (2003), excluding the municipal area of the capital city Lima 
e.  Source: Author’s own calculations for municipalities from data provided by the Bureau of Local 
Government Finances, 2001-2005 
 